Abstract: Snow Leopard poaching and trafficking – referred to herein as Snow Leopard crime – is revisited 13 years after TRAFFIC’s first report on the subject, Fading Footprints: The Killing and Trade of Snow Leopards (Theile, 2003). This report builds on a preliminary analysis published in May 2016 (Maheshwari and von Meibom, 2016). It addresses a major information gap concerning the linkage between retaliatory killing for livestock depredation and poaching for trade, and the scale at which both are taking place. The focus is on 12 Snow Leopard range countries: Afghanistan, Bhutan, China, India, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Nepal, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. There is little evidence of illegal trade in Snow Leopards outside these countries.
Two sets of data were developed in the research for this report. The first is a Snow Leopard crime database containing records of seizures (legal actions taken by government authorities) and observations (reports of Snow Leopard killing, capture or trade, including market surveys). The database contains records dating back to 1989 (which are discussed in Annex 1), but the analysis focuses on the period since the release of Fading Footprints, the first TRAFFIC report: 2003-June 2016. Seizures are a function of law enforcement effort, effectiveness and publicization, as well as the magnitude of illegal trade, and so observations are an important component of the analysis, particularly for countries where few seizures are made or reported. However, detailed observations are not regularly published, and may be are biased toward countries where there is more effort, so a simple multiple choice survey was designed for Snow Leopard experts. Completed by 42 of them in 2016, and covering all 12 range countries, the survey asked experts for their total number of known cases, case outcomes, and reasons for killing Snow Leopards.
Based on the average number of cases known to experts over the average of nine years spent working in their geographic areas of knowledge, 221-450 Snow Leopards were estimated to have been poached annually since 2008. With the average rate of poaching detection estimated by experts at less than 38%, these numbers could be substantially higher. Of these, 55% are killed in retaliation for livestock depredation, 21% killed for trade and 18% taken by non-targeted methods such as snares. Although retaliatory killing is estimated to account for roughly half of Snow Leopard poaching (55%), experts estimate that there is a 50-50 chance (48%) that a poaching attempt will take place after a depredation incident. On average, experts estimate that 60% of retaliatory and non-targeted poaching incidents result in an attempt to sell; accounting for differences in this estimate between countries, a total of 108-219 Snow Leopards potentially enter into illegal trade. Over 90% of annual Snow Leopard poaching is estimated to occur in five range countries: China (103-236), Mongolia (34-53), Pakistan (23-53), India (21-45) and Tajikistan (20-25).
Given the uncertainties about population numbers, as well as the low rate of poaching detection, it is difficult to assess the impact of this offtake on the viability of the species. Snow Leopard range is used as a proxy for Snow Leopard population numbers; most national Snow Leopard population estimates are derived from extrapolating study site densities across likely range. Although China had by far the highest number of seizures and observations (309 Snow Leopards from 2003-2016) and the highest annual poaching estimate, its share of Snow Leopard crime was not disproportionate to its large share (at least 60%) of Snow Leopard range. Countries flagged for having disproportionate shares of crime levels relative to share of range included Afghanistan and Russia (seizures and observations), and Nepal and Pakistan (annual poaching estimates). China and Russia were most frequently identified as destinations for animals poached in other countries.
The expert survey indicates that the scale of Snow Leopard crime is more serious than apparent from the annual average number of Snow Leopard seized (18) or observed (34) from 2003-2016. This could be in part due to the challenges of law enforcement in the Snow Leopard’s remote montane habitat. Indeed, the survey found that an average of 23% of known cases were investigated by authorities, and only 14% prosecuted.
The minimum number of Snow Leopards in the seizures and observations database fell by 43% from the first half of the analysis period (2003-2009) compared to the second (2010-June 2016) (from 451 to 259). However, the decline was in the number of Snow Leopards observed in trade and in market surveys, which fell by 80% (from 280 to 54), with the largest decline taking place in China. There were more market surveys in the first half of the analysis period (13) than the second (5), but they
TRAFFIC report: An Ounce Of Prevention: Snow Leopard Crime Revisited xi
were repeated in the same places (Kabul, Afghanistan and cities in western China), and far fewer skins were seen (for example, 60 skins in the Chinese city of Linxia in 2007, compared to one in 2011). The numbers of Snow Leopards in other observations were roughly equivalent for the two periods (108 in the first and 100 in the second), but the numbers in trade observations fell by 46% (from 52 to 28). Otherwise, the number of Snow Leopards seized rose by 16% (from 115 to 133), and the number of individual seizure cases rose by 77% (from 44 to 78). The number of poached Snow Leopards seized doubled (from 31 to 60), and the observed number of poached Snow Leopards also increased by 14% (from 56 to 64). The number of Snow Leopards in trade seizures was the same in both periods (55), and the number smuggled roughly equivalent (29 seized in the first period, and 24 seized and observed in the second).
There are three possible interpretations of this situation of rising numbers of Snow Leopards poached (as measured by seizures and observations), steady numbers in smuggling and trade seizures, and steeply declining numbers in trade observations and market surveys. It could be that the limitations of available data and the authors’ inability to collect all of it has resulted in an incorrect picture. It is apparent that illegal trade has become more clandestine and difficult to detect in most countries, so that secondly, it could be increasing, as indicated by the apparent rise in poaching numbers. However, the number of Snow Leopards seized in large cases (more than 3 Snow Leopards per case), indicative of organized trafficking activity, declined from 60 in the 2003-2009 to 23 in 2010-2016. This points to a third possibility: that trade (and perhaps demand) is declining, possibly due to increased enforcement, but local people continue to opportunistically sell Snow Leopards they poached primarily to protect livestock.
With skins being the main Snow Leopard product type in trade (78%), the primary motive for buyers appears to be for display, with some observations of skins hanging on walls in homes and restaurants, as well as stuffed taxidermy specimens. Priced in the thousands of US dollars, skins have been described as a “symbol of wealth and power.” However, there probably exists very little in the way of a definable consumer segment deliberately seeking out such items. They are most likely purchased opportunistically – “impulse buys” – and most consumers probably only buy one in their lifetime. Once in a home, the illegal possession has very low probability of detection, and moreover law enforcement authorities may be reluctant to investigate in such situations. The purchase itself also has a low probability of detection, as indicated by the sharp decline in observed numbers of Snow Leopard skins being offered for sale. While growing personal wealth in Asia has been highlighted as a primary driver of illegal wildlife trade, poverty is also recognized as a driver, and the Snow Leopard trade may be more driven by rural people in Snow Leopard habitat attempting to make money and make up for livestock losses to predators than by wealthy people placing orders for luxury household decorations. Unlike the demand-driven Tiger trade (Annex 2), to which it otherwise bears many similarities, the market for Snow Leopards may be more a function of supply, and actions should focus on the communities living near Snow Leopards to reduce incentives to poach and sell. This notion is reflected in the aphorism behind the title of this report: an ounce of prevention equals a pound of cure. Preventing livestock losses, offsetting the costs of losses and improving community support for Snow Leopard conservation are the most important approaches to tackling the problem of Snow Leopard trafficking.
Recommendations focus on addressing the leading cause of Snow Leopard poaching (retaliatory killing/Human-Wildlife Conflict) as well as measures to stem illegal trade, and are primarily targeted at the 12 Snow Leopard range countries. They are aligned with existing recommendations and planned actions, including CITES recommendations, draft Decisions and consultant’s reports around implementation of Resolution Conf. 12.5 (CITES 2015, 2016; Nowell and Pervushina, 2014); the Global Snow Leopard and Ecosystem Protection Program (GSLEP, 2013, 2015, n.d.); the SLN’s Snow Leopard Survival Strategy (SLN, 2014); and WWF’s Snow Leopard Species Action Plan (WWF, 2015 and Sharma, 2016). There was also an informal discussion about recommendations to address poaching and illegal trade at the Second China Snow Leopard Forum, held in Urumqi, Xinjiang province 24-26 August 2016 (B. Weckworth, Panthera, pers. comm.).
Recommendations are grouped according to four primary actors in Snow Leopard conservation: 1) governments of Snow Leopard range countries; 2) communities living in Snow Leopard range; 3) conservation organizations and Snow Leopard experts; and 4) donor governments and agencies.